During the last years, researchers have focused on designing secure and efficient RFID authentication protocols. The vast majority of these protocols assume proximity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios, an intruder can be located between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick the latter into thinking that the prover is in close proximity. This attack is globally known as a relay attack, a kind that includes others such as distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinder relay attacks. Several protocols have been proposed in the last years, but vulnerabilities of major or minor relevance have been identified in all of them. In 2008, Kim et al. [10] proposed a new distance bounding protocol with the objective of being the best one in terms of security, privacy, tag computational overhead and fault tolerance -as claimed by their authors. The study of this recent protocol is the main subject of this paper. We present a passive full disclosure attack which allows an adversary -listening the public messages exchanged on the channel-to discover the long-term secret key of the tag. The presented attack is very relevant as it implies that none of the protocol security objectives are guaranteed. Additionally, we also show that the probability of a successful mafia fraud attack against the Reid et al. protocol [16] is bounded by (3/4) n and not by (7/8) n as Piramuthu states in [15] .
Introduction
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) provides a means to identify items (i.e. persons, animals or products) to which an RFID tag is attached. RFID tags support more functionality than barcodes, and the accuracy in the identification process is increased [9] . While barcodes facilitate the make and model of a product, RFID tags offer the possibility of distinguish between products of the same kind (unequivocal identification of labeled items).
Specifically, a RFID system is composed of three main components. Readers (transceivers) interrogate tags (transponders) to access the information stored in their memory. Afterwards, they pass this acquired information to a backend database which employs it as a search index to allocate all the information associated with the target tag. Readers and tags use the radio channel for communication, which is commonly assumed to be insecure. On the other hand, as readers and the back-end database are computationally much more powerful than tags, a secure channel is commonly assumed.
RFID technology may be envisioned as the substitute of barcodes. However, the massive adoption of this technology is being delayed due its associated security threats [9, 12] . To understand these, a simple example is described in the following: Suppose that an exclusive jeweler is tagging all its jewels. From the jeweler's point of view, the use of RFID technology increases stock control performance, allowing to know the whole state of the stock almost in real time, and to track it efficiently. One or more days are usually needed for stock checking when barcodes are used, so the advantages are clear. On the other hand, there are also negative implications. Imagine that you buy the rings for your wedding to that jeweler. An attacker can read the tags incorporate in the rings and classify you and your partner as a wealthy and promising customer, as the jeweler's name of your rings is part of the unique identifier of each tag. Information about consumer habits is also at stake. On the other hand, as a static identifier is often provided each time a tag is read, your tags (rings) may be easily associated with you and your partner. Afterwards, if you were read many times by different readers, your movements may be tracked and recorded. As it should be clear after this example, privacy and tracking are the main concerns that come to mind when you think on RFID technology. However, in this paper we focus on a different problem which is denominated relay attack and is gaining attention in the last years. For example, Hlavac and Rosa [8] notice how proximity cards conforming to ISO/IEC 14443 can be abused by a relay attack exploiting timeouts in the communications.
Related Work
Generally, a relay attack occurs when a valid reader (or tag) is fooled by and adversary into believing that it is communicating with an authentic tag (or reader). To defend against these attacks, distance bounding protocols are commonly used. As an alternative, the measure of the signal strength might be considered, but the problem with this approach is that an adversary can easily cheat the prover by transmitting with much more power than it is allowed. Distance bounding protocols were first introduced by Brands and Chaum to preclude distance fraud and mafia fraud attacks [2] . The authors proposed a mechanism to infer an upper bound of the distance between the verifier and the prover by measuring the round trip delays during a rapid challenge and response exchange of n bits. Around fifteen years later, Hancke and Kuhn [6] proposed a distance bounding protocol in the context of RFID technology which may be considered a seminal paper in this research area. Munilla and Peinado [14] later proposed a protocol inspired on [6] in which the success probability of an adversary in a mafia fraud attack is reduced. However, the feasibility of this scheme is questionable as three physical states {0, 1, void} are required. In [17] , a distance bounding protocol is combined with binary codes to facilitate the corrections of errors (noisy channels) during the rapid bit exchange. In [13] , this scheme is questioned regarding its security and implementation cost on RFID tags. The above mentioned protocols do not address terrorist fraud attacks, which can be seen as a natural extension of mafia fraud attacks. In 2007, Tu and Piramuthu addressed these problems together and proposed an enhancement scheme [18] . The authors used the same ideas previously presented in [16] to prevent terrorist attacks. This promising protocol was, nevertheless, vulnerable to a simple active attack as shown in [10] , in which a new protocol attempting to correct the deficiencies of all its predecessors is presented.
Our contribution.
In this paper, we analyze the protocol proposed by Kim et al. in [10] , which may be considered the nowadays most secure and efficient distance bounding protocol -their authors claim that the scheme combines all the features one may expect in a RFID system. However, we find the protocol presents a vulnerability that makes it insecure to a passive attack. We emphasize that passive attacks are much less exigent than active attacks (e.g. mafia and fraud attacks) as the attacker only has to eavesdrop the messages passed on the channel. As a consequence of the passive attack presented below, the attacker can acquire the full long-term secret key of the tag. We also prove that Piramuthu [15] miscalculated the adversary's success probability for mafia fraud attacks regarding to Reid et al protocol [16] . Finally, we provide some guidelines to design a secure distance bounding protocol resistant to relay attacks and passive eavesdroppers.
Relay Attacks
When designing an RFID distance bounding protocol three attacks [3, 4] have to be protected against: 1) distance fraud attacks; 2) mafia fraud attacks; 3) terrorist fraud attacks (see Figure 6 in Appendix A).
Definition Distance Fraud In this attack two entities are involved: the first (honest reader R) is not aware of the attack performed by the second party (fraudulent tag T ). The attack enables T to convince R of a wrong statement related to its physical distance to R.
Context sharing, isolation, unforgeable channel, time of flight are all general techniques which offer complete or partial resistance to distance fraud attacks [4] .
Definition Mafia Fraud In this attack three entities are involved: the two firsts (honest tag T and reader R) are not aware of the attack performed by the third party (intruder I). This enables I to convince R of a false assertion related to the private key of T .
The mafia fraud was first described by Desmedt [5] . In this attack, the intruder is modeled as a couple {T , R}, where T is a dishonest tag interacting with the honest reader R and where R is a dishonest reader interacting with the honest tag T . With the help of R, R is convinced by T of an assertion related to the private key of T . Specifically, the assertion consists on the fact that the tag is within a given physical distance.
Definition Terrorist Fraud In this attack three entities are involved: the first (reader R) is not aware of the attack performed by the collusion between the other two parties (the dishonest tag and the intruder or terrorist tag T ). The attack enables T to convince R of an assertion related to the private key of T .
This attack can be viewed as an extension of the mafia fraud attack. In this case, the dishonest tag T colludes with terrorist tag T . The dishonest tag T uses T to convince R of its proximity, while in fact it is a swindle. T does not know the long-term secret key of T .
4 Distance Bounding Protocol of Kim et al. Kim et al. proposed two authentication protocols which include a distance bounding protocol in [10] . Basically, they first proposed a basic scheme and later an efficient version of this basic scheme. Our proposed attack is equally effective against any of these two schemes as they are based on the same assumptions. The basic protocol -see Figure 7 in Appendix A-is split into three phases:
Preparation Phase: The reader first chooses a random number N A and transmits it to the tag. On receiving it, the tag chooses a random N B and computes a temporary key a := f x (C B , N B ), where x is the permanent secret key and C B is just a system-wide constant. The tag them splits his permanent secret key x in two shares by computing Z 0 := a and Z 1 := a ⊕ x. Finally, the tag transmits N B to the reader.
Rapid Bit Exchange; This phase is repeated n times, with i varying from 1 top n, and the challenge response delay is measured for each step. The readers starts by choosing a random bit c i , initializing the clock to zero and passing c i to the tag. The values received by the tag are denoted by c are below a threshold T , the tag is authenticated. Finally, in that cases in which reader authentication is also demanded, the reader computes t A := f x (N B ) and sends it to the tag.
The authors argue that the security bound against mafia attacks is 2 −n . For terrorist attacks, they affirm it is bounded by 2 −v assuming that the adversary knows at least n-v bits of the long-term secret key. Finally, the authors claim privacy is guaranteed as no confidential information is transmitted in clear on the channel. However, the two versions of the protocol, as show in Sections 6 and 7, are vulnerable to a passive attack which wrecks all the above mentioned objectives.
Terrorist Fraud Attack
In this section we summarize the most important proposals which pursue to be strong against terrorist fraud attacks. We focus on the distance bounding protocol and more precisely in the mechanism to accomplish this objective.
In [4] , Bussard and Bagga addressed the attack where a malicious prover and an intruder collaborate to cheat a verifier. The prover picks a random one-time key {a ǫ R A} and encrypts its private long-term key x according to a public known symmetric encryption algorithm {E a (x)}. The prover them splits his permanent secret key in two shares by computing Z 0 := a and Z 1 := E a (x). The use of public cryptography makes the scheme infeasible for low-cost RFID tags due to its severe resources constrains (i.e. computation, storage, power consumption, etc.). A bit commitment and a proof of knowledge is also required, leaving beyond all possibilities or doubt its support on these constrained devices.
Reid et al. [16] replaced asymmetric cryptography by symmetric cryptography in order to facilitate its implementation on limited resource devices (i.e. sensor networks, RFID tags, etc.). The prover, then, computes a session key {a := f x (ID A , ID B , r A , r B )}, where f symbolizes a keyed hash function. Finally, the prover splits his permanent secret key into two shares by computing Z 0 := a and Z 1 := a ⊕ x. Tu and Piramuthu [18] proposed a new protocol arguing that the identities of both the prover and the verifier were transmitted in clear in [16] , allowing its traceability. That is correct, but they do not mention that the protocol was not proposed in the context of RFID, where anonymity is itself a security objective of the protocol. On the other hand, they claim that the probability with which a mafia fraud attack can occur is bounded by (7/8) n [15] . Its argument is completely incorrect because the authors claim that f x (ID A , ID B , r A , r B )} and f x (ID A , ID B , r ′ A , r B )} only differ in 1/4 of the bits when only the argument r A changes and the rest remain constant. However, on average half of the bits will change when f is a keyed hash function (e.g. CBC-MAC or HMAC, with an almost perfect avalanche effect) as authors suggested in its paper [16] . n .
Theorem 1 In Reid et al. protocol, the probability that a mafia fraud attack can occur is bounded by (
Proof An adversary could slightly accelerate the clock signal provided to the tag and transmits an anticipate challenge c ′ i before the reader sends its challenge c i to the tag. In half of the times, these values fit in, that is c ′ i = c i , and therefore the adversary will have in advance the correct answer r i to the reader. In the other half of the cases, the adversary can replay with a guessed bit, being correct again half of the times. So the adversary has 3/4 probability of answering correctly. As the above process is repeated n times and results are independent, the probability of success for an adversary is bounded by (3/4) n .
In [10] , an active attack against Tu and Piramuthu protocol is proposed. Basically, the attacker toggles a bit sent by the reader in the rapid bit exchange and leaves the response unaltered. The attacker observes the reader reaction and derives a bit of the long term secret key. To prevent this attack, message t B is included by Kim et al. in their proposed scheme (see Figure 7 in Appendix A).
A Full Disclosure Passive Attack
In this section we present a passive attack against the protocol of Kim et al. [10] which exploits the weak protection mechanism adopted to offer resistance against terrorist fraud attacks. The described attack is not only applicable to [10] but it is also successful against its two predecessors [16, 18] .
Focusing in the distance bounding protocol, Kim et al. proposed that the tag sends Z 0 i := a i or Z 1 i := a i ⊕ x i when receiving the challenge r i = 0 or r i = 1, respectively. The knowledge of Z 0 and Z 1 is equivalent to the knowledge of the long-term secret key x, since Z 0 ⊕ Z 1 = x. Authors argue that the use of Z 0 and Z 1 frustrate terrorist attacks since dishonest tags (T ) can not transmit both values to an intruder (I). However, we show how a passive attacker can disclosure the long-term secret key without requiring any collaboration of T or alteration/forwarding of the messages transmitted on the channel.
Theorem 2 In Kim et al. protocol [10], a passive attacker eavesdropping on the channel different executions of the authentication protocol can derive the long-term secret key of the tag (the prover).
Proof Suppose n = 1, that is, only one challenge and response bit is transmitted during the rapid bit exchange:
1. Eavesdrop one authentication session. The attacker identifies the session by the random number N B sent by the tag just before the start of the rapid exchange phase. He stores the bits {c i , r i } exchanged on the channel during the rapid bit exchange.
Eavesdrop a new authentication session. If N *
B is equal to the value stored in Step 1, the attacker stores {c * i , r * i } and jumps to the next step. Otherwise, he repeats this step.
Check for the non equality between c i and c
Step 2 is repeated.
The generalization of the attack for an arbitrary n value is straightforward:
1. Eavesdrop one authentication session. The attacker identifies the session by the random number N B sent by the tag just before the start of the rapid exchange phase. He stores the bits {c i , r i } n i=1 exchanged during the channel in the rapid bit exchange. Therefore, the attacker can acquire the long-term secret of the tag by only eavesdropping several authentication sessions, and focusing on the rapid bit exchange phase. In the next section, we analyze the number of sessions required depending on both the number of challenge and response bits passed during the rapid bit exchange (n) and the probability that errors appear in the channel (Bit Error Rate -BER). Readers should note that the attack just presented is the most harmful attack that a tag can suffer because its success implies the rest of possible attacks (non-privacy, traceability, mafia and terrorist fraud attacks, etc.).
Experimental Results
In this section, we scrutinize the number of sessions required to accomplish our proposed attack. We start considering an ideal scenario in which there are no transmission errors in the channel. Then, we adopt a more realistic approach and we consider scenarios where transmission errors can occur both in the backward and in the forward channel.
Ideal communication channel
We could start implementing directly the attack presented in the above section. However, this attack is not very efficient as the average number of sessions required to see the same N B random number is 2 −t , where t is the bit length of N B . However, the efficiency of the attack can be increased notably if instead of focusing on an unique N B , we use the information of all eavesdropped sessions. We will in this way create a dictionary, where words represent each session, that is, each possible N B random number corresponds to a word. The bits {c i , r i } n i=1
exchanged on the channel during the rapid bit exchange are the meaning of each word. We explain the proposed procedure below: Readers should note that a list of all the values (meanings) of each word could be maintained but it would significatively increase storage demands. We decide to store only the last value at the expense of losing a bit of efficiency for obtaining a gain in performance.
We simulate the above experiment for different numbers of challenge and response bits transmitted (n={8, 10, 12,..., 30}) during the rapid bit exchange. In fact, for a fixed n value, we repeat the experiment 2 14 times to obtain an average value. The results are presented in Figure 1 . As shown in this figure, the number of eavesdropped sessions is increased when the number of bits passed during the rapid bit exchange is increased. For example, 3, 310 and 99, 526 eavesdropped sessions are required for n = 20 and n = 30, respectively.
Real communication channel
In this section we consider that errors can appear in the channel. Specifically, we assume that errors are possible both in the backward and the forward channel. To facilitate the presentation of the results and without loss of generality, we consider the same probability of error in both channels. Therefore, the channel (forward or backward) produces a bit error with probability q, independently affecting each transmitted bit (c i or r i ).
We start our experimentation, repeating the experiment presented in the above section. As some bits suffer errors, the probability of success is not 100%. That is, some bits of the conjectured key may be incorrect. So, if one o more bits of the key are incorrect we count this experiment as an error and only when the whole key is acquired a success is scored. The results of our experimentation are presented in Figure 2 . We can observe how the probability of success is over 80% when the Bit Error Rate (BER) is 10 −3 . On the other side, in the case when the BER is extremely high (BER=0.015), the probability of success declines quickly as we increase the number of bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange. However, the effectiveness of the above attack can be improved up to 100% at the expense of increasing the number of sessions eavesdropped. For a particular p probability of success, we can estimate the average number of required sessions by means of the experiment explained below. In fact, p value can be interpreted at the percentage in terms of bits that coincide with the searched key.
1. Initialize the meaning of the words of the dictionary to null value (i.e ∀ N B , dictionary[N B ] = null). Additionally, the list of possible keys is also initialized to null.
2. Eavesdrop one session of the authentication protocol. We identify the session by the random number N B sent by the tag.
(a) Check if the word exists in the dictionary. If it is not registered, we store the bits transmitted on the channel during the rapid bit
). Otherwise, we jumps to the next step. (c) Compare the conjecture key with the pursued key. If the difference between these values is inferior in number of bits than p × n, the overall process is stopped. Otherwise, we jump to Step 2 again.
We accomplish an in-depth study of the number of sessions required by experimenting according the procedure just described. As before, we repeat each experiment 2 14 times to obtain an average value. Figures 3-5 summarize the results obtained.
In Figure 3 , we display the number of sessions required for p = 1 and p = 0.9. Making a comparison between these results, we observe that the number of sessions is increased in one order of magnitude when we pass from recovering the 90% to 100% of the key bits. For p = 0.9, the influence of the number of errors in the channel is clearly only noticeable when the BER is extremely high. However, for p = 1, we easily notice the difference between each BER value. As expected, the number of required sessions increases when the number of challenge and response bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange raised and/or the number of errors in the channel (BER) increased.
In Figure 4 , we study what happens when there number of errors in the channel is high. Specifically, we explore the number of required sessions for different probabilities values (p = {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}) and a fixed probability of error in the channel (BER = 0.03 or BER = 0.06). For a moderate high BER = 0.03, there is not significant difference between the number of session required for recovering a part of the key (i.e. 60-70%) or almost the whole key (i.e 90%). On the contrary, this difference is evident when the BER reaches a very high value (as 0.06). From these figures we conclude that doing almost the same effort, we can obtain a higher percentage (i.e 90 %) of the whole number of bits of the key whenever the number of errors in the channel was not extremely high.
Finally, in Figure 5 we examine what happens in the case of suffering a huge number of errors in the channel (BER = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09}). We estimate the number of required sessions for recovering the whole key (p = 1). If the number of bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange is inferior than 20, the values obtained for these three cases are in the same order of magnitude. Over 20 bits, the number of sessions increased drastically when we pass from 0.03 to 0.06 or 0.09. We conclude that even for an extremely high BER of 
Design Guidelines
In this section, we describe the standard procedures that authors should consider to design a more secure and efficient RFID protocol against relay attacks. We focus our attention on distance-bounding protocols in which the reader (prover) sends a single-bit challenge and the tag (verifier) replies a rapid single-bit response. The above procedure is repeated n times, where n represents a security parameter. Finally, the reader computes an upper-bound of the distance between both entities by measuring the delay time between the challenges and the responses. We emphasize that the tag has to send its answer immediately after receiving a challenge from the reader in order to have precision in the measure.
Distance Fraud
This fraud is possible when there is no relationship between the challenge bits and the response bits exchanged during the distance verification. If a dishonest tag T knows at which times the challenge bits are sent by the reader R, he can trick R by sending out the response bits at the correct time before receiving the challenge bits. R thus computes a wrong upper bound of its physical distance to T . We present three solutions, being the last one recommended due to the feasibility problems associated to the implementation of the two firsts alternatives.
Solution A: The reader sends challenges bits at randomly chosen times. By means of this countermeasure, T cannot send response bits before he has received the challenges bits as T can not predict when the reader expects to receive a response. Brands and Chaum suggested it is enough that R sends its response randomly at one of two discrete times (i.e. each 3i or 3i + 1 clock cycles). The strategy has a success probability of ( 1 2 ) n if the selection of discrete times is random [2] .
Solution B: The reader can use void challenges [14] to detect that T is not waiting for receiving the challenge bits. A void challenge is a challenge which the reader intentionally leaves without sending. That is, the challenge bits c i sent by the reader can take three different values {0, 1, void}. If the reader detects that a response bit is received during the interval of a void challenge, the dishonest tag T is detected. As before, the strategy has a success probability of ( 1 2 ) n . Note that the inclusion of void challenges is equivalent to outputting the challenges bits c i = {0, 1} at randomly chosen times.
Solution C: The tag T must select its response depending on the challenge sent by the reader R. A possible scheme is presented below:
Step 1 R generates at random n bits c i .
Step 2 T generates at random n bits m i and commits to these bits by a secure commitment scheme (i.e. commit{m i , ..., m n }).
Step 3 Rapid bit exchange can start. This phase is repeated n times, with i varying from 1 to n, and the challenge-response delay is measured for each step:
R sends bit c i to T and initializes the clock to zero. T replays with r i = c i ⊕ m i immediately after he receives c i .
On receiving r i , R stops the clock and stores the delay time.
Step 4 T opens the commitment and R verifies wether
. If so, R computes an upper bound of the distance using the maximum of the delay times measured.
As in solution A, the success probability for an adversary is at most (
Mafia Fraud Attack
A rapid bit exchange must be used to prevent mafia attacks as suggested by Hancke and Kuhn in [6] . In this protocol, the success probability with which a mafia attack can occur is bounded by ( n [18] . However, this probability is higher than the ( n optimal value. To achieve this optimal value, as suggested in [10, 2] , the tag has to sign or encrypt the bits sent back and forth during the rapid bit exchange. A possible scheme is presented below, where R and T symbolize the reader and the tag, respectively.
Step 2 T generates at random n bits r i .
R sends c i to T and initializes the clock to zero.
T replays with bit r i immediately after he receives c i .
On receiving r i , R stops the clock and stores the received value and the delay time.
Step 4 T concatenates the 2n bits of the challenges and responses {c 1 , r 1 , ..., c n , r n }, signs or encrypts the resulting message, and sends the result to R.
The reader determines an upper bound on the distance to the tag using the maximum of the delay times measured. As a final step, the reader checks the correctness of the challenge-response bits by using the last encrypted/signed message. If the signature/encryption scheme is secure an adversary has a success probability of at most ( 
Terrorist Fraud Attack
It is commonly assumed that the private key of the tag cannot be stolen by an intruder and that the tag will not disclose the key to any party. In [3, 4] , Bussard suggested a mechanism in which basically the tag (prover) would have to be forced to reveal its private key to mount a success terrorist attack. Despite of being correct from a theoretical point of view, the proposed scheme is impractical to limited devices as it depends on the use of public key cryptography. Some alternatives have been presented in the context of low-cost RFID tags but all of them, as showed in our proposed attack (see Sections 6 and 7), are vulnerable to a full disclosure attack performed by a passive attacker. As alternative, we present two schemes that offer protection against terrorist attacks and conform to the resources restrictions of constrained devices. First, we assume that tags have an encryption function (E) [1, 7] and a Pseudo-Random Function -PRF (f ) [11] . In the second proposal, tags only possess a PRF and can compute simple bitwise operations. These two schemes are described below, being x the long-term key linked to the tag:
1. Preparation Phase. The tag computes a temporary key (e.g. f x (N R , N T , W )), where N R/T symbolizes a random number generated by the reader (R) / tag (T ) and W represents any additional parameter. The tag them splits his permanent secret key x in two shares by computing:
-Alternative A: Z 0 := a and Z 1 := E a (x).
-Alternative B: Z 0 := a and
T and W ′ symbolizes a random number generated by T and any extra parameter respectively. 
Rapid Bit Exchange
This phase is repeated n times, with i varying from 1 to n, and the challenge-response delay is measured for each step.
Step 1 R generates a random bit c i , initializes the clock to zero and passes c i to T .
Step 2 T replays bit r i := Z ci i immediately after he receives c i .
Step 3 On receiving r i , R stops the clock and stores the delay time. Proof Suppose that the attacker knows n−v bits of the secret key. Additionally, we can assume the worst scenario in which the dishonest tag T also transmits the whole n bits of Z 0 to T (idem reasoning to Z 1 and challenge bits r i = 1). Under this situation and during the rapid bit exchange, T may reply incorrectly to v of the n challenge-response bits in which the secret key was not revealed for that i positions. For that cases, in half on the times he receives r i = 0 and therefore T knows the response in advance as Z 0 was completed revealed. In the other half of the cases (r i = 1), T can replay with a guessed bit, being correct in half of the times. So the adversary has a 3/4 probability of answering correctly.
Dictionary attack
As a consequence of splitting the key to offer protection against terrorist attacks, a dictionary attack may be conducted by an active attacker. Basically, for a session N B , the adversary fixes c i challenge bits to a constant value ({c i = 0}
). Next, he waits until the same N B session value is outputted by target tag and sets c * i challenges bits to the one's complement of c i . At this point, the attacker would know Z 0 and Z 1 , that is, the long-term secret key would be revealed. The feasibility of this attack will depend on the number of bits (n) passed during the rapid bit exchange. Reader should note that the bit length of the long-term key is set to n. As the number of rapid bit steps is often not too high (i.e. n = [20 − 40]) the generation of a dictionary is viable. To prune the success probability of this attack, an additional twist can be taken in the scheme presented in the above section:
-Alternative A: Z 0 := a and Z 1 := E a (x). 
Rapid Bit Exchange
Step 1 R generates a random bit c i , initializes to zero the clock and passes c i to T .
Step 2 T replays bit r i := Z ci i ⊕ R ci i immediately after he receives c i .
Step 3 On receiving r i , R stops the clock and stores the delay time.
Conclusions
Taking physical location into account has a strong impact on security. However, the majority of authentication protocols are vulnerable to relay attacks. While the measure of the power is ineffective, distance bounding protocols seem an appropriate countermeasure to this kind of attacks. In the context of RFID technology, researchers have addressed this open problem in the last few years. Despite of the existence of different proposals, all of them resulted partially or completely insecure. In 2008, Kim et al. proposed a promising scheme. Authors claim that the protocol presents all the features (i.e. privacy, security, efficiency, etc.) one may expect from an RFID system. In this paper, we show how the protocol is not as secure as the authors assert. In fact, a simple passive attacker can disclosure the long-term secret key after eavesdropping several authentication sessions. Finally, we present some general design guidelines that should be followed by researchers that want to design a secure and efficient distance building protocol for constrained devices.
B Basic Distance Bounding Protocol
An authentication protocol combined with a rapid bit exchange is displayed bellow [10] .
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